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CHAPTER I 
THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Purpose of the Study 
Justification has been widely used as a concept in social psychology 
in such areas as attribution theory, labeling theory, and cognitive 
dissonance. Even though widely used, the concept itself has received 
rare attention. The attention it has recei'(ed.has been largely of.a 
theoretical nature. The purpose of this study is.to experimentally 
examine the concept of justification and the influence of justification 
upon attributions -of responsibility. With this purpose in mind, the 
·treatment of the concept in psychology will be examined. 
There have been two approaches to justification in the literature 
of social psychology. One has considered justification as.an external 
contingency which is commonly accepted as a sufficient reason for behav~ 
ing in a particular manner (Abelson, Aronson, McGuire, Newcomb, Rosenberg, 
and Tannenbaum, 1968}. The most.frequently cited example of-this 
approach is the finding that lying in an experiment is justified for $20 
but not for one dollar (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959). The second 
approach has considered justification as a tactic in the presentation of 
self to others (Scott and Lyman, 1968}. This approach concerns i ndi- · 
viduals' attempts to avoid labels of deviance (Schur, 1971} and ensuing 
negative sanctions (Scott and Lyman, 1968} by providing acceptable. 
reasons or positive aspects of untoward action. 
l 
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In the present study a synthesis of these approaches is drawn which 
presents justification as a judgment made by individuals and_ dependent 
upon personal and situational variables. The synthesis deals with the 
problem of why some individuals will refer to an act as justified while 
others will not. 
The synthesis can be associated with the term perceived justifi-
cation, which is introduced to represent judgments of an act's justifia-
bility as made by an individual. Perceived justification is studied in 
relation to attributions of responsibility. The study of responsibility 
attributions deal with the processes by which individuals assign respon-
sibility for an event. 
The originator of current attribution theories, Heider (1944, 1958), 
considered the relative assignment of responsibility to two sources: (1) 
the person who is associated with the action and (2) the situation in 
which the action occurs. Heider considered five "levels" of relation-
ships between these two sources. The first three levels concern the 
attribution of responsibility for unintentional outcomes. Respectively, 
these levels deal with outcomes for which there is no personal action, 
personal action with unforeseeable outcomes, and personal action with 
foreseeable outcomes. The remaining two of the five levels involve 
intentional outcomes. These two levels shall be considered in the pre- 1 
sent study. Heider believed that when an action and outcome are inten-
tional (Level IV), much responsibility will be attributed to the person 
associated with the action. When an action and outcome are intentional, 
but justified by external contingencies (Level V), less responsibility 
will be attributed to the person and more responsibility will be attri-
buted to the situation. As the difference between the two levels is the 
relative presence of justification, the influence of perceived justifi-
cation upon attributions of.rei;ponsibility for an intentional act is 
studied in this experim~nt .. 
The concept of defensive attribution has been identified by others 
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as a mediating variable in the processes of responsibility attribution 
(Walster, 1966; Shaver, 1970). Shaver has suggested that, with conditions 
favorable to defensive attributions, as outcome severity increases less 
responsibility for the outcome will be assigned to the person who could 
have caused the outcome. Since, as shall be shown, (1) the conditions 
for defensive attributions are similar to·conditions for justification 
and (2) defensive attributions and justification have similar effects on 
attributions, it is considered herein that defensive attributions may be 
an example of the effect. of perceived justification upon attributions of 
responsibility. 
One of the variables which will be presented as mediating percep-
tions of justification is the degree to which an act reflects attitudes 
which are shared or approved by an observer of the act. One result of 
shared attitudes may be interpersonal attraction (Byrne, 1971). A problem 
is therefore created for interpretation of this study. ~!hile attempting 
to vary perceptions ·Of justification, it is likely that. attraction will 
vary also. As interpersonal attraction is a potential confounding varia-
ble for an understanging of justification, it is examined in relation to 
the other variables of .the study. 
A comment about the organization of the remainder of the chapter 
will be helpful. Present interest in justification grew out of an inter-. 
est in responsibility attriputions. To und~rstand the development of the 
concept of perceived justification, a background in certain aspects of 
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attribution theory is necessary. Therefore, literature pertinent to 
attributions of responsibility will be reviewed prior to literature 
directly relevant to justification. This review will establish the 
background from which the concept of perceived justification will emerge, 
Importance of Responsibility Attributions 
If research is to be invested in an area, it should be hoped that 
the information gained will contribute to a larger body of knowledge 
{Kuhn, 1970). In the present case, therefore, the contributions of an 
understanding of the processes by which responsibility is assigned shall 
be discussed. 
The study of attribution processes concerns how the individual infers 
causality for the events in his world. Given such a definition, i.e,~ 
the perception of causality, the study would appear to be one for the 
psychologist of perception {Michotte, 1963). However, the attributions 
of present concern deal with causation of social behavior, not inanimate 
events. Attribution theory may,be considered as the study of how the 
layman behaves as a social psychologist: how the layman attempts to 
explain and control social phenome~a {Heider, 1958). 
The study of the responsibility attribution process is important 
in a variety of the areas of social psychology. Historically, the first 
area in which responsibility attribution was discussed was the area of 
social sanctions for criminal acts {Heider, 1944; Maciver, 1942). Upon 
the occurance of a crime, how does one deter~ine who committed the crime 
and, upon determining who is guilty, what sanctions should be applied? 
The question may be restated as, 11 Who is responsible and how responsible 
is he? 11 Thus, besides social psychology, responsibility attributions 
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may be seen to be of interest to students of jurisprudence. 
A second area of social psychology to which responsibility attri-
bution is significant is the study of.how an observer perceives another 
individual as possessing 11 personality traits 11 (Heider, 1958; Jones and 
Davis, 1964). As shall be discussed later, it has been hypothesized that 
personal dispositions are inferred from behavior. However, if an action 
is to possess significant information value for disposition inference, 
an actor must be seen as being responsible for the action. When an 
actor is not responsible for an action, the action can provide little 
information about the person. When an actor is responsible, the action 
is potentially high in information value. Hence, the question of how 
people assign responsibility can be seen as relevant to the study of 
person perception. 
A fairly recent t~end in social psychology has been the study of 
social problems and their possible alleviation; Here, too, the perceived 
source of responsibility is of significance (Caplan and Nelson, 1973; 
Scott and Lyman, 1968). Solutions for a problem are addressed to that 
which is perceived as the cause of the problem. If the victims of the 
problem are seen as being responsible for the problem, the solution is 
usually designed to change the victims. As an example, if 11 underprivi-
ledged11 persons are viewed as responsible for their poverty, to attack 
poverty the victims must be motivated or educated. But, if responsibil~ 
ity for a problem is assigned to the social environment or system, then 
solutions will deal with the social situation. Ryan (1970) has illus-
trated a tendency in American society for problems to be defined as 
victim caused. He has suggested that thi.~ approach dehumanizes t~e 
victims and exacerbates many problems. Therefore, an understanding of 
attribution process would be of value to the area of .social change, 
To briefly summarize this discussion, responsibility attribution 
has been shown to be of importance to the areas in social psychology.of 
sanctioning behavior, person perception, and social change, It should 
be borne in mind that these topics are not the only ones for which 
attribution processes are of relevance, but are mentioned as indicators 
of the impact of responsibility attributions on social phenomena. 
Heider 1 s Attribution Theory 
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What is referred to as attribu~ion theory in social psychology is 
not a unified theory but a group of theories. Several of these theories 
are interrelated and some are related only in terms of the topic of 
attributions. The major emphasis in this review is the theory proposed 
by Fritz Heider, and subsequent theories of defensive attributions. 
These theories are not the only theories of attribution. They are dis-
cussed here because it is thougbt that they are more applicable to the 
( 
present concerns than are alternative theories. For information on 
other theories of attribution, books by Jones, Kanouse, Kelley, Nisbett, 
Valins, and Weiner {1971), Sh~w and Costanzo (1970), and Stone and 
Farberman (1970) are recommended, 
Causal Attributions. 
Heider 1 s work on the perception of social causality has been the 
primary impetus to the field of attribution theory. There were, of 
course, antecedants to Heider 1 s contributions, but his organization and 
synthesis 9f his antecedants has made his work a landmark in the maze of 
social psychology. Heider discussed the importance of social causality 
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to person perception in a 1944 article, and his major theory was present-
ed in 1958 in his book, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. 
Following the work of Brunswik {1952) on visual perception, Heider 
{1958) suggested that similar processes may operate in person perception. 
It was Brunswik 1 s view that man. perceives the external world by refer-. 
ring transient and variable events to invariant properties (see also 
Gibson, 1969). Heider posited that in person perception the search for 
invariant properties leads to the attribution of personal dispositions. 
The concept of dispositions is simil.ar to the concept of personality 
traits~ in that dispositions ... dispose" individuals 11 to manifest themselves 
in certain ways under certain conditions•• (Heider, 1958~ p. 80). Accord-
ing to Heider, dispositions are inferred from an observer's analysis of 
the causes for an actor's behavior. Therefore, to understand how an 
observer attributes dispositions, one must first understand how the ob-
server perceives soci~l causation. 
Heider {1958) stated that an action results from a combination of 
factors within the person and factors within the environment. These two 
sets of factors were described as effective personal force and effective 
environmental force. If an action occurs and effective personal force 
is perceived to be the stronger of the forces, the action will be attri-
buted more to personal causation. If effective environmental force is 
seen as being stronger, the action will be attributed more to impersonal 
causation. 
Effective personal force may be broken down into its consituents 
which are 11 trying 11 (active intention) and 11 power 11 (ability). When 
11 power 11 is sufficient to overcome effective environmental force, the 
actor 11 can 11 (capability) perform the action. An attribution of personal 
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causality will be made when it is jointly perceived that an action is the 
result of an actor's active intention and capability. Inferences about 
capability are derived from a backdrop of effective environmental force. 
If an action is thought to have been difficult, then capability is 
perceived as being high; If an action is simple, less capability is 
attributed. Intentions are inferred from their property of equifinality, 
by the apparent goal, and from knowledge of the actor's prior behavior. 
When a person attempts diffe~ent means to achieve a goal (equifinality), 
intention may be inferred. The apparent goal of behavior is that out-
come among a number of outcomes of the action which is judged to be most 
attractive. The more attractive outcome is considered to have been the 
intended outcom~. Experience with a person's past behavior and inten-
tions in similar situations may also aid in fnferring present intentions. 
Heider stressed the point that intention is the central factor in per-
sonal causality. 
Responsibility Attributions 
Moving from causal attributions to responsibility attributions, 
Heider (1958) did not clearly distinguish between the two types of attri-
butions. There are suggestions, though, that responsibility refers to 
accountability and sanctionability. For example, in his di~cussion of 
responsibility he states, 11 ••• the question of premeditation is impor-
tant in the decisions regarding guilt" (p. 112), 11 ... a person may be 
congratulated upon the victory of his school's football team" (p. 113), 
and 11 ... [he] may be accused of bringinQ harm to [another] ... 11 (p. 113). 
That he is referring to accountability is further indicated in his 1944 
article when he discusses the work of Fauconnet (1928): 11 Fauconnet says 
that all situations which give rise to the ideas of responsibility 
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(th~ attribution ef a arime tea person} [italics added] can be classed 
in two groups: ... contiguity and ... similarity11 (Heider, 1944, p. 362). 
Unless Heider modified his definition in the 14 years between the publi-
cation of the twe works of present concern, it would appear that res-. 
ponsibility in his model refers to an individual's accountability for 
an action. 
Ability and intentions are important factors in a ttri but ions of 
personal responsibility, although ability is of less import thaQ inten-
tions. 11 People are held responsible for their intentions and exertions. 
but not so strictly for their abilities 11 (Heider, 1958, p. 112). Per-
sonal r~sponsibility was also seen to vary with-the relative contri-
butions of effective environmental force to the action outcome .. The 
more the environment contributes to the action, thEl less personal res-
ponsibility is attributed. He syggested the existence of five levels of 
relationships between personal and situational (impersonal) r~sponsi­
bility. As the levels ascend, the conditions for attributions of per-
sonal responsibility become more specific. Titles for the levels were 
presented by Shaw and Sulzer (1964) who also provided experimental 
support for their general operation as theorized by Heider. 
Level I. Global-Association: 11 , •• [T]he person is held res pons i bl e 
for each effect th.at is in any way connected to him or that seems in 
any way to belong to him 11 (Heider, 1958, p. 11'3). For example, the 
Jewish people were frequently persecuted in Christian countries for 
being the 11 Chri st;Ki 11ers 11 hundreds of years after their ancestors may 
have participated in a crucifixion. 
Level II. Extended Commission: The person is held responsible for 
any effect which he caused, even though he did not intend and could not 
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have foreseen the effect. Heider described this level as being similar 
to Piaget 1 s (1932) 11 objective responsibility 11 • Responsibility at this 
level is responsibility for an unforeseen accident which resulted from 
a person 1 s action. 
Level III. Careless Corrmission: The person is considered respon-
sible for an effect which resulted from his action and that he could and 
should have foreseen, but which he did not foresee and was not part of 
his intentions. He is considered to lack either sufficient restraint, 
judgment, or mental capability. 
Level IV. Purposive Commission: The person is held responsible 
only for those effects which resulted from his active intention: actions 
which resulted from personal causation. Motives are the central factor 
as in Piaget 1 s (1932) 11 subjective responsibility 11 • 
Level V. Justified Commission: 11 The person is held only partially 
responsible for any effect which he intentionally produced if the cir-
cumstances were such that most persons would have felt and acted as he 
did. That is, responsibility for the act is at least shared by the 
coercive environment 11 (Shaw and Sulzer, 1964, p. 40). This level is of 
primary concern to the present proposal and shall be discussed at 
greater length when the concept of justification is considered. 
Theories of Defensive Attribution 
Other work in the area of responsibility attribution, which is 
somewhat independent of Heider's (1958) theory, deals with defensive 
attribution. Defensive attribution is of interest for it may aid in 
our understanding of the meaning of responsibility. Also, as will be 
seen later, defensive attribution may be related to justification, 
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Walster {1966) proposed that, for a person presented as being potentially 
at fault for an accident, the amount of responsibility attributed will 
increase with the seriousness of the accident's consequences. She argued 
that accidental misfortunes of slight magnitude will be attributed to 
chance since they are common events in the lives of everyone, e.g., the 
common response to an apology for a slight offense, "Think nothing of 
it; it happens to the best of us." However, catastrophes are not so 
common and people do not like to think that major misfortunes can befall 
them. Therefore, the person potentially at fault will be more closely 
and personally associated with the occurrence of the event as a means of 
disassociating the observer, thereby making it seem more unlikely that 
a similar event could happen to the observer. By assigning greater per-
sonal responsibility (blaming the actor) for the outcome, the observer 
differentiates himself from the actor. 
In Walster's first experiment (1966) to test the hypothesis, college 
students listened to tape recordings which described an accident involv-
ing the automobile of a high school student. As severity of consequences 
increased, so also did the responsibility assigned to the automobile's 
owner, thereby supporting the hypothesis. The hypothesis fared less well 
in Walster's next report (1967). Two studies were performed in which 
high school and college students were provided with the following infor-
mation: a person had acquired a house and had broken even or lost or 
gained varying amounts of money on the investment. The outcome was 
depicted as having been the result of external, uncontrollable events. 
Subjects in the first experiment assigned less responsibility to the 
stimulus person for extreme outcomes while subjects in the second experi-
ment did not assign differing amounts of responsibility for extreme 
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outcomes. Results for both experiments were contradictory to Walster's 
hypothesis and earlier data. To briefly review, Walster's hypothesis 
was supported by one experiment, opposite results were provided by 
another, and no difference was found in a third. 
After failing to find experimental manipulations which would provide 
responses supportive to Walster's (1966) hypothesis, Shaver (1970) pro-
posed that defensive attributions were not attempts to avoid the 
occurrence of a negative event but were attempts to avoid blame for 
negative events. Of three experiments which he conducted (1970), only 
one produced a significant difference between responsibility attributions. 
For this experiment, female undergraduates were presented with the 
severe outcome information from Walster's 1966 experiment. The stimulus 
person was also presented as a female college student. Subjects were 
given one of two sets of instructions: to assume that they were similar 
to the sti~ulus person or different than the stimulus person. Subjects 
with 11 similar 11 instructions assigned less responsibility to the stimulus 
person than subjects with 11 different 11 instructions. Shaver proposed 
that when similarity is high between strlmulus person and observer, the 
stimulus person's involvement in an accident means that the observer 
also can be involved in a similar accident. As the observer wants to 
avoid responsibility for severe accidents, the observer tends to deny 
that people like the observer are responsible for such accidents. 
Several later experiments have supported this hypothesis for negative 
consequences (Shaver and Carroll, 1970; Shaw and Skolnick, 1971), 
although support has not been unequivocal. 
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Definition of Responsibility 
Recall that Heider (1944, 1958) apparently meant by responsibility 
the degree to which a person could be held accountable for an action and 
the degree to which he would be liable to receive social sanctions. 
Shaver (1970) seems to have held similar views when he equated responsi-
bility with blame. Several problems arise from this definition. In 
discussing his fifth level of responsibility, Heider (1958) commented 
that 11 responsibility for the act is at least shared by the environment 11 
(p. 114). One may ask, though, if it is possible to apply social sanc-
tions to the environment. The environment may be considered as a causal 
factor, but it is somewhat immune to sanctions. 
Another and more important problem concerns the interpretation of 
research results. Most studies which have dealt with responsibility and 
responsibility attributions have used responsibility in the sense that 
responsibility reflected causation (as examples: McMartin and Shaw, 1972; 
Pepitone and Sherberg, 1957; Walster, 1966 and 1967). Further, in many 
studies subjects have been asked questions about responsibility and the 
answers have been interpreted in terms of causation. Besides causation, 
if one were to follow Heider's definiti-0n, should not these results have 
been interpreted relative to the' degree to which social sanctions were 
deserved? Perhaps the real question is when asked to assign responsi-
bility, do subjects respond on the basis of causal influenced of sanc-
1tionability? Or stated more succinctly, what is the relationships be-
tween causation and sancti onabil ity in res pons i bil ity attri bu ti ans? 
Shaw and Reitan (1969) have provided data which is relevant to 
these questions. They presented scenarios which represented Heider's 
five levels of responsibility (1958) to non-college student subjects 
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(lawyers, policemen, military personnel and ministers). Scenarios 
varied on levels, intensity of outcomes, and positive and negative quali-
ty of outcomes. The experiment involved the use of 40 scenarios with 
two scenarios in each cell of the design (Form A and Form B). Half of 
the subjects evaluated the responsibility of the actor for the outcome 
in each Form A scenario and assigned sanctions to the actor in each Form 
B scenario. This order was reversed for the other half of the subjects. 
Besides supporting the operation of Heider's levels in responsibility 
attributions, Shaw and Reitan found that the mean for responsibility 
attributions (mean = 2.39) was significantly greater than the mean for 
sanction assignment (mean= 1.59). This relationship existed in varying 
positive degrees across all cells of the design. Also, their data 
demonstrated that,outcome intensity had a greater influence on sanctions 
than on responsibility. 
The experiment by Shaw and Reitan (1969) supported their hypothesis 
that sanction assignments differed from responsibility attribution. 
Responsbility attribution was found to be a necessary, but not sufficient, 
consideration in sanctioning behavior. 
Whiteside (1973) has also studied responsibility attributions and 
sanction assignments. His experiment was close to being an empirical 
replication of Shaw and Reitan's (1969) study. Scenarios, different 
than used by Shaw and Reitan, which represented Heider's levels (1958) 
plus another level proposed by Whiteside (1973) were presented to college 
student subjects. Scenarios varied on levels, intensity of negative 
outcome, and information content. For scenarios which presented the 
basic information for each level, responsibility attributions perfectly 
supported Heider's levels of responsibility. However, sanction assign-
ments did not increase as levels ascended. For Heider's levels there 
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was only a significant difference in s~nctions between Purposive Commis-
sion and Justified Commission with greater sanctions applied to Purposive 
Commission .. The correlation between responsibility and sanction assign-
ments was significant at the .05 level. Inspection of the correlations 
within levels and oatcome severity indicated that the correlations were 
greater for the severe outcomes and often not statistically significant 
for the moderate outcomes. Whiteside concluded that ''while sanctioning 
assignment and atttribution of responsibility are related, the relation-
ship is not as close ~s it would at first seem" {1973, p. 58). 
Returning to the questions of the relationship between causation 
and sanctionability in responsibility attributions, the studies just 
cited suggest that both factors are related to responsibility. Both 
studies have demonstrated that sanction assignment is often affected by 
different considerations than are responsibility attributions. It may 
be safe to infer that responsibility primarily follows.from perceptions 
of causation and that the effect of accountability is secondary. There-
fore, the action of those researchers who have interpreted responsibility 
as causality appears to be justified. 
Justification 
Relevant theories of responsibility attribution and the meaning of 
responsibility have been reviewed. Attention may now be directed to 
literature in social psychology which has employed the concept of justi-
fication. 
Social psychology as studied by psychologists occasionally qiffers 
from social psychology as studied.by sociologists. One such difference 
exists in the manner in which justification is defined. Further, eac~ 
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discipline has approached the problem of the influence of justified 
action on attributions from a different perspective. These approaches 
shall be discussed separately. In the next chapter a synthesis will be 
attempted. 
Perspectives From Psychology 
Psychologists in social psychology have consistently referred to 
justification as an external contingency which is commonly accepted as 
a sufficient reason for behaving in.a particular manner. Dist:riminative 
stimuli and reinforcements are reasons for acting, but unless they are 
socially accepted as sufficient reasons for behaviors, they are not 
justifications. Justification has been considered in studies dealing 
with cognitive dissonance (see Abelson, et al., 1968) and studies of 
attribution processes. It was from these works that the above definition 
of justification was derived. 
As mentioned earlier, Shaw and Sulzer (1964) titled Heider's (1958) 
fifth level for responsibility attribution as "Justified Commission". 
Paraphrasing Heider, they describe this level as one in which 11 [t]he 
person is held only partly responsible for any effect that he intention-
ally produced if the circumstances were such that most persons would 
have felt and acted as he did 11 (Shaw and Sulzer, 1964, p. 40). Note 
that the primary dimensions of justified action by this definition are 
(1) the circumstances of the situation and (2) socially acceptable 
behavior in the situation. Intentionalityis also present, but the intent 
is induced by the circumstances and not by personal dispositions __ or 
motives. Of course a personal disposition or motive mu~t exist which 
the circumstances make salient for intentionality to be elicited.· How-. 
ever, the motives, under other circumstances, would not lead to the same 
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intentions. For example, a direct and immediate threat by another on 
one's life may elicit intentions from what may be termed a motive of 
self-preservation so that physical aggression is directed towards the 
other person. Under less extreme circumstances, though, a motive of 
self-preservation r~rely causes one to ~ehave in a physically aggressive 
manner. As another, less violent example, a person with a disposition 
of obedience would not be particularly predisposed toward intentions of 
mowing his lawn. Add a command by his wife that he mow his lawn and he 
develops intentions.about lawn mowing. Although intentionality is a 
component of justified action, it can be considerd as subsumed by the 
dimension of the circumstances of the situation. Assuming that the 
situation is the source of intentions, responsibility for a justified 
action should be attributed more to the situation than to the actor. 
This argument is supported by findings of Whiteside (1973) that greater 
situational than personal responsibility is assigned in Heider's level 
of Justified Commission. 
The second dimension of justified action, social acceptability, is 
inferred from the phrase of Shaw and Sulzer (1964) 11 ••• most persons would 
have felt and acted as he did 11 {p. 40). If most people would act in a 
similar situation, then it may be assumed that the behavior is socially 
acceptable in the situatibn. Here, too, the situation is of importance. 
A behavior may be acceptable for that situation, but not other situations. 
Also, a behavior may not be deemed acceptable in any circumstances. Pro-
viqing information to an enemy during war is considered unjustified even 
when doing so terminates torture. 
Having extrapolated upon the Heider - Shaw and Sulzer approach to 
justification, it may be instructive to consider how other theorists of 
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attribution processes have discussed justification. 
Kelley (1971) has reviewed literature on aggression in terms of 
the influence of justified action on attributions. He appears to have 
equated external justification with external causation. He indicated 
that intentionality is attributed to the actor for unjustified acts but 
not for justified acts. 
Some examples: The gu~rd on a boat prevents you from boarding 
but with a good justification; a bus driver passes you as you 
wait at a bus stop but you see that the bus is out of service 
and on its way to the garage; a person with whom you had an 
appointment calls to cancel it with the explanation that he 
is ill. In the arbitrary cases [that is when an external 
justification is absent] the attributor is pretty much reduced 
to attributing the behavior to the frustrating agent's own 
desires or whims (Kelley, 1971, p. 14). 
As support for his thesis, Kelley (1971) cited several studies in 
which frustration or aggression from another person was either arbitrary 
or nonarbitrary (Burnstein and Worchel, 1962; Epstein and Taylor, 1967; 
Rothaus and Worchel, 1960). Subjects in these experiments responded 
with greater aggression toward the arbitrarily noxious person. Kelley 
concluded that subjects reciprocated the apparent intentions rather than 
the amount of injury. Subjects appeared to have assigned causation to 
the environment for nonarbitrary noxious stimuli and to have assigned 
causation to personal resppnsibility for arbitrary frustration or 
aggression. Thus, intentionality is reflected more by arbitrary than 
nonarbitrary (justified) action. 
A few comments are offered by Kelley (1971) which are pertinent to 
the social acceptability dimension of justification. He suggests that 
a person who complies with illegitimate power will be considered to be 
personally responsible for his action. Although Kelley's attention is 
directed to the perception of causality, he admits that attributions 
may also reflect attempts at "moral control". Thus, immoral action, 
even when resulting from strong external forces, is attributed to the 
actor as a means of preventing further immoral acts since sanctioning 
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as a means of control is appropriate for acts of personal responsibility. 
The effects of justified action upon perception of one's own 
beliefs has been considered by Nisbett and Valins {1971). They speak of 
insufficient justification to describe stimuli which cannot be considered 
as sufficient causation for behavior. Overly sufficient justification 
is used to describ~ stimuli which can be seen as more than sufficient 
causation. From a discussion of research on Festinger's {1957} theory 
of cognitive dissonance and on Bern's {1967} counter-argument of self-
per~eption, Nisbett and Valins propose that, under conditions of insuf-
ficient justification, an actor will attribute responsibility for his 
actions to himself and, under conditions of overly sufficient justifi-
cation, responsibility will be attributed to external stimuli. T,he prob-
lem of interest to the authors is how an actor atrributes attitudes to 
himself. They propose that attitudes are inferred from behavior, but, 
as external justification increases, "the less likely [the actor] will 
be to infer that his attitudes toward the stimulus are congruent with 
his behavior" {Nisbett and Valins, 1971, p. 77}. With sufficient justi-
fication the actor perceives external stimuli to be responsible for 
his action; he does not need to explain his behavior in terms of ·his own 
dispositions. 
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The similarities among the approaches toward justification and 
attribution are apparent in the theories of Heider (1958), Kelley (1971), 
and Nisbett and Valins (1971). The conceptualizations of justification 
and the attribution processes are similar. The only noticeable differ-
ence is that Heider and Kelley both deal with attributions assigned by 
an observer and Nisbett and Valins are concerned with attributions 
assigned by an actor to himself. 
Perspectives from Sociology 
While psychologists of social psychology have considered justifi-
cation as stemming from the external situation, several sociologists of 
social psychology have discussed justification as a representation of 
the actor's defjnition of the environment. These sociologists of the 
interactionist school have stressed the social nature of one's definition 
of the environment. They have not dealt with attributions of responsi-
bility or dispositions, but have contributed much to an understanding of 
processes effecting the attribution of identities and labels (Lofland, 
1969; Schur, 1971; Scott and Lyman, 1968). The work of Scott and Lyman 
(1968) will be used to illustrate this approach. 
Scott and Lyman (1968) are concerned with attempts by actors of 
untoward action to provide explanations which relieve themselves of 
blame. These explanations, or definitions of the situation, are referred 
to as accounts. Two types of accounts are discussed: excuses and justi-
fications. Excuses are defined as "socially approved vocabularies" which 
shift blame to external phenomena. Justifications assert that an indi-
vidual is responsible for an event, but that an outcome's negative 
characteristics are outweighed by positive characteristics. Observe that 
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Scott and Lyman's use of 11 excuse 11 is more similar to justification as 
defined earlier than is their use of 11 justification 11 • Instead of focus-
ing justification on the action and situation as did Heider and others 
mentioned earlier, Scott and Lyman focus justification on the outcome 
and situation. The authors cite several types of excuses and justifi-
cations but seem to consider both excuses and justifications to function 
similarly as accounts. 
The acceptance of an account by others is dependent upon several 
variables. The major variable, however, is whether or not an other is 
a member of one of the actor's 11 speech communities 11 (Scott and Lyman, 
1968). Individuals are usually a member in several speech communities 
which are human aggregates in which the individual frequently interacts. 
Each such community develops norms for the description of actions and 
the expression of motives. If an account for an action fits with those 
accounts which are normative for the community, there is a greater prob-
ability of acceptance than otherwise. Certain accounts are appropriate 
orily ·wi:thin the· speech forms of" a specific community. Jherefore, i:t can 
be seen that accourits are social phenomena whbse expression,and accep-
tance is dependent upon other .s.ocial phenomena. As stated by C. Wright 
1!1ills, 11What is reas-on for one man is rationalization fo:r. a·noth'er 11 




Psychologists have considered the influence of external justifi-
cation upon attributions assigned by observers. As a simplification, 
sociologists have considered what might be described as internal justi-
fication: justifications as presented by actors. To draw a synthesis 
from these perspectives, consider that the definition of external con-
ting~ncies sufficient to justify specific actions is learned through 
social interaction (Bandura and Walters, 1963). This understanding of 
the social nature of external justification is similar to the social 
nature of acceptable accounts (Scott and Lyman, 1968). Thus, as actors 
learn through social interaction to propose acceptable accounts, so do 
observers learn to determine justifying contingencies. Both phenomena 
are based on socially defined ways of viewing and expressing relation-. 
ships in the physical and social environment. 
When the social nature of justifying conti.ngencies is made salient, 
a question emerges which may not otherwise have been evident: 11 What 
are the conditions which influence the degree to which a specific observer 
will consider a specific act as justified? 11 Why do some people consider 
an act as justified while others do not? 
If one were to find oneself in a burning house, there exists wide 
agreement that one is justified in removing oneself from the premises. 
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However, in some former societies the new widow was not to remove her-
self from her late husband 1 s pyre as she and much of her husband 1 s pro-
perty were to travel in death with the husband. Her death was justified 
and not to have remained on the pyre would have been unjustified. If 
one has supported a president who is later found to have committed acts 
of questionable legality, he who has supported the president is much 
more likely to consider the acts as justified than others who have views 
at variance with the president. The example of how to behave when in a 
fire illustrates widely accepted social defin'ltions and justification is 
unlikely to be disputed within the social settings. The example of a 
possibly miscreant president displays disputed justification and the 
dispute appears to center on divergent attitudes. Thus, it appears 
attitudes may influence perceptions of justification. 
Heider (1958) suggested that environmental forces which exert a 
powerful influence toward an action are major components of Justified 
Commission. It th,us appears likely that the degree of situatiqnal in-
fluence will effect perceptions of justification. Recall the formerly 
popular question used by Selecfive Service Boards to disqualify appli-
cants for Conscientious Objector status: 11 What would you do if a man 
were about to kill your wife and you had no way to stop him but by 
killing him? 11 Although the applicant may have been against killing in 
war, he was presented with what most applicants would consider as justi-
fication for killing. A non-conscientious objector would be more likely 
to consider both killing in war and killing to remove dire threats as 
justified. Returning to the example of a miscreant president, those 
opposed to the president would require less information on criminal 
activities in order to think that removal from office would be justified 
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than would those persons .who had supported the president. But, if infor-
mation on criminal ectivities continued to increase, eventually former 
supporters would consider removal from office as justified while members 
of the opposition would continue to believe it justified. While it is 
unwise to base a theory on anecdotal information, these examples suggest 
an influence of situational forces on perceived justification. Also, 
they suggest that differences in situational forces may have a greater 
influence on individuals who have a generally unfavorable attitude 
toward an action. 
As with the Heider (1958) - Shaw and Sulzer (1964) definition of 
justification, perceptions of justification may be described as depen-
dent upon two dimensions. The dominant dimension is suggested to be the 
degree to which an actor's behavior reflects motives or attitudes which 
are shared or approved by the attributer. This dimension shall be 
entitled 11 Attitude 11 , and will refer to the attributer's attitude. The 
second dimension, entitled 11Situa1;ion 11 , is considered to be the degree 
to which situational forces are perceived by the attributer as eliciting 
the response. Hypothesis l of the current study predicts that observers 
for whom an action reflects approved attitudes will consider the action 
as more justified than will observers who do not approve of the reflected 
attitude. Hypothesis 2 states that, under conditions of low situational 
demand, subjects will cqnsider an act as less justified than when the 
same act is performed under high situational demand. Hypothesis 2a, 
however, states that judgments of justification will be less affected by 
apparent situational demand for observers who approve of the actor's 
attitud~s than will be judgments by observers who do not approve of the 
actor's attitudes. Thus, judgments by observers with attitudes divergent 
to the actor's attitudes will be more influenced by situational demand. 
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Responsibility Attributions 
Heider 1 s (1958) levels for responsibility attribution were discussed 
above. Shaw and Reitan (1969) and Whiteside (1973) have provided evi-
dence that high personal responsibility is assigned for acts at the 
level of Purposive Commission while relatively low personal responsibil-
ity is assigned at the level of Justified Commission. From Heider 1 s 
(1958) description of each level it can be seen that the central factor 
in Purposive Commission is that the actor intended to perform the 
action and the intention resulted from the actor's dispositions and 
motives. For the level of Justified Commission, the actor intended to 
perform the action, but the intention resulted from situational con-
straints. Hence, the difference between these two levels is that in one 
intentionality is seen as deriving from environmental influences, Given 
an intentional act; responsibility attributions are dependent upon cog-
nitions about the origin of intentions. It is suggested that the varia-
bles Attitudes and Situation influence these cognitions. When conditions 
are favorable to perceptions of justification, attributions are expected 
to be similar to earlier findings with the level of Justified Commission, 
When conditions are unfavorable to perceptions of justification, attri-
butions should be similar to findings with Purposive Commission, 
Hypothesis 3 states that observers who do not share the attitudes 
reflected by an action will assign more personal responsibility than 
impersonal responsibility. Further, this pattern should be reversed for 
subjects who approve of the actor's motives. Hypothesis 4 predicts that 
greater impersonal responsibility will be attributed when apparent 
situational constraints are high and greater personal responsibility will 
be assigned when situational constraints are low. This hypothesis is 
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modified slightly by Hypothesis 4a which states that attributions.by 
disapproving observers will be more influenced by manipulation of situ-
ational impact than will be attributions by approving subjects. 
The degree of situational influence upon an action has been pre-
sented as a variable effecting perceptions of justification. As a test 
of this assertion, Hypothesis 5 predicts that a positive relationship 
will exist between perceived justification and attributions of impersonal 
responsibility. 
Defensive Attribution 
Shaver (1970) has proposed that when an actor is similar to an 
observer, the observer is very likely to make increasingly defensive 
attributions for the actor as outcome severity increases. Recall that 
to assign less personal responsibility in order to avoid blame is Shaver's 
definition of a defensive attribution. Note also that an observer is 
very likely to see others who are presented as being 11 similar 11 (Shaver, 
191oi or similar in sex and status (Shaver and Carroll, 1970) as behaving 
from similar attitudes. As a variation on Shaw and Sulzer's (1964) 
definition of Justified Commission, one could say for a similar other 
that 11 ... [the observer] would have felt and acted as [the actor]did •.. 11 • 
As Shaver's defensive attributions.for outcome severity has actor-observer 
\ 
similarity as its central determinant, and as perceived justification 
also is proposed to be influenced. by similarity, theoretical parsimony 
may be achieved by considering defensive attribution as an example of 
the effect of justification upon responsibility attributions. 
When the conditions conducive to perceived justification are present, 
Hypothesis 6 predic;ts that, as action extremity increases, impersonal 
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responsibility will increase and personal responsibility will decrease. 
When conditions favorable to perceived justification are absent, imper-
sona 1 res pons i bil ity wi 11 decrease and persona 1 res pons i bil i ty wi 11 
increase as action extremity increases. 
The primary concerns of the present investigation are to determine 
factors which influence perceptions of justification and to determine 
the influence of these factors upon attributions of responsibility. 
Defensive attributions as attributions for extreme actions are included 
as a secondary issue to study possible generalizations of perceived 
justifi~ation. Conditions thought necessary for the major concerns 
have imposed two possible handicaps on the investigation of defensive 
attribution. These limitations are that theorists of defensive attri-
bution have consistently studied attribution for accidents and extreme 
outcomes while the present concern is with ~ntentional action and 
extreme actions. Although observers may be·as defensive for intentional 
acts as for accidents, it is an empirical question which this study does 
not systematically investigate and, therefore, may pose a problem to 
interpretation. The difference between extreme outcomes and extreme 
actions is thought to be a smaller thorn. In the present experiment, 
increases in action extremity imply increases in outcome extremity. 
A'l;traction 
A positive relationship between attitude similarity and interpersonal 
attraction has been demonstra~ed in an impressive number of experiments 
(for reviews see Byrne, 1971, or Griffitt, 1974). It has been argued 
in the present paper that when an actor's behavior is seen as being 
motivated by approved attitudes, an observer will consider the behavior 
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as justified. Therefore, in making a case for the effects of perceived 
justification on attributions, it may appear that a case is being made 
also for the effects of attraction on attributions. In observation of 
actions among friends, this confounding may indeed b~ common. In the 
present study, however, it is believed that justification will be a more 
potent influence than attraction. 
Byrne (1971) has pointed to data which indicate that attraction 
for another increases as the number of similar attitudes increases. 
With a few similar attitudes attraction is relatively small and with many 
similar attitudes attraction is relatively high. In the present study, 
one salient attitude will be reflected by an action. Observers will 
either agree or disagree with the attitude. As only one attitude will 
be presented, it is expected that attributions will be more closely 
related to perceived justification than to attraction (Hypothesis 7). 
Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Observers for whom an action reflects approved 
attitudes will consider the action as more justified than 
will observers who do not approve of the reflected atti-
tudes. 
Hypothesis 2: Under conditions of low situational demand, 
subjects will consider an act as less justified than: 
when the act is performed under high situational 
demand. 
Hypothesis 2a: Justification will be less effected by manipu-
lation of situational demand for observers who approve 
of an actor's attitudes than will be judgments by 
observers who do not approve of the actor's attitude. 
Hypothesis 3: Observers who do not approve of the attitudes 
reflected by an action will assign more personal respon-
sibility than impersonal responsibility and this pattern 
will be reversed for observers who do approve of the 
attitudes. 
Hypothesis 4: Greater impersonal responsibility will be 
attribu~ed when apparent situational constraints are high 
and greater personal responsibility will be attributed 
when constraints are low. 
Hypothesis 4a: Attributions by disapproving observers will 
be more influenced by manipulations of situational 
impact than will attributions by approving observers. 
Hypothesis 5: A positive relationship will exist between 
perceived justification and attributions of impersonal 
res pons i bil i ty. 
Hypothesis 6: vJhen conditions conducive to perceived justifi-
cation are present, impersonal responsibility will 
increase and personal responsibility will decrease as 
action extremity increases. The opposite pattern should 
occur when conditions unfavorable to perceptions of 
justification are present. 
Hypothesis 7~ Attributions will be more closely related to 
perceived justification than to attraction. 
Attitude Material 
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To test the above hypotheses an action is required which reflects 
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attitudes important to the experimental subjects and attitudes on which 
subjects disagree. For economy it was thought best to select an atti-
tude on which subjects would strongly and fairly evenly divide. Intro-
ductory psychology students at Oklahoma State University were surveyed 
on a wide variety of attitudes. The topic of abortion was selected as 
it appeared to have the best fit with selection criteria. It follows 
that an action which would reflect attitudes toward abortion would be 
the action of having an abortion. 
The use of an abortion as the stimulus material presents two possi-
ble problems. The first problem is to determine who is the actor. Medi~ 
cal abortions are performed upon pregnant women, but a woman cannot 
become pregnant without a mate. Therefore, should a woman, a man, or 
both be presented as the actor? A consideration of common verbal des-
criptions of abortions indicates that the woman is usually considered 
the actor; "Mary had an abortion", "Joe's wife had an abortion", or 11 He 
told his wife to have an abortion". As can be seen even in the case in 
which the husband instructs his wife to have an abortion, the wife 11 has 11 
the abortion. Perhaps the only manner in which a man is seen as the 
actor is when a male doctor performs the abortion. To avoid possible 
confounding effects of presenting a medical doctor {high status) as the 
stimulus person, the actor in the experiment was presented as a woman, 
Responsibility of the woman's husband was assessed to check the validity 
of the assumption that the woman would be seen as the primary actor. 
A second possible problem from the selection of abortion is related 
to the first, Men may vie\'/ responsibility for an abortion differently 
than do women since women are the ones who have abortions. Men may 
consider women more responsible while women may consider men more 
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responsible. This particular battle of the sexes is considered unlikely, 
especially in the current experiment in which the woman is identified 
as the actor. However, since such a possibility cannot be disregarded, 





The subjects were 156 students in introductory psychology who re-
ceived course credit for participating in the experiment. Twenty-one 
of the subjects were students at Oklahoma State University and 135 sub-
jects were students at Tulsa University. The distribution of subjects 
by sex was 69 males and 87 females. 
Procedure and Stimulus Material 
Each subject was given a booklet which contained instructions, 
stimulus material, and response items. The first page of the booklet 
contained instructions on how to report responses. The second page 
presented a question on the subject's attitude toward abortion: 
Only under the most extreme circumstances should a woman 
be allowed to have an abortion 
Strongly agree .. .Strongly disagree 
Stimulus material was presented on the third page of each booklet. 
This material consisted of a description of a Situation and Action. 
Situation and Action were independent variables with two levels of each. 
A booklet presented one level of both variables. 
The two conditions of Situation were (1) High Situational Force and 
(2) Low Situational Force. · R.espectively: 
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Situation 
Herb and Fern were a young married couple. Both of 
them were working part ... time to put themselves through 
college. Their parents could not afford to help pay their 
way through school. During their freshman year, Fern 
became pregnant. Having a child at that time would severely 
hinder their getting through college. Fern would have to 
stay at home with the baby and Herb would have to work full ... 
time at a low ... paying job to support them. 
Situation 
Herb and Fern were a young married couple. Both of 
them were full ... time college students. Their parents had 
comfortable incomes and were glad to provide money for 
Herb and Fern while they were in school. During their 
freshman year, Fern became pregnant. Having a child at 
that time would not hinder their getting through college. 
They had sufficient resources to take care of any added 
expenses such as medical or baby ... sitting expenses. 
The two conditions of Action were (1) Low Extreme and (2) High 
Extreme. Respectively: 
Action 
During the second month of the pregnancy, Fern termi-
nated her pregnancy by having an abortion. 
Action 
During the fifth month of the pregnancy, Fern termi-
nated her pregnancy by having an abortion. 
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Dependent measures concerning responsibility assignment, justifi-
cation, and attraction were taken following presentation of the stimulus 
material. These measures were in the following form. 
How much do you consider Fern to be responsible for the 
Action? 
Very little ••............. Very much 
How much do you consider the Situation to be responsible 
for the Action? 
Very little ... , ..... .Very much 
How much do you consider the Action to have been 
justified? 
Very little •...... .Very much 
How much do you think you would like Fern? 
Very little ....... . . . Very much 
How much do you consider Herb to be responsible for the 
Action? 
Very little ...... . . . . . Very much 
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Subjects were instructed to respond by circling a point on each 15-
point scale which reflected their answer to a question. 
On the last page of the booklet, subjects were asked to indicate 
their sex. 
Ethics 
Before beginning their partfcipation, subjects were informed that 
it was acceptable to terminate participation at any time. This infor-
mation was repeated twice in the experiment booklets. All subjects 
completed the experiment. 
On the final page of the booklet, subjects were asked if they had 





Subjects were assigned to the levels of Attitude (Pro or Anti abor-
tion) on the basis of their responses to the question concerning atti-
tudes toward abortion. Twelve subjects who provided neutral responses 
were removed from the analyses. As there were 16 cells in the ANOVA 
design (disregarding the repeated measure analyses) and the fewest number 
of subjects in a cell was five, subjects were randomly eliminated from 
other cells to achieve an equal cell size of five. Thus, data from 80 
subjects was included in the analyses. 
Data from each dependent variable was subjected to an analysis of 
variance. Each analysis of variance included Attitude, Situation, Action, 
and Sex (of subject) as independent variables. Before proceeding to 
present results related to hypothesis testing, data pertaining to the 
use of abortion as a stimulus topic will be presented. Two possible 
problems from the use of this topic were mentioned earlier. 
The first problem was to determine the actor in an abortion: the 
wife or the husband. It was proposed that the woman usually is con-
sidered to be the primary actor. The experimental material was prepared 
on this assumption. To test the validity of this assumption in the 
experiment, responsibility assignments for the wife and for the husband 
were treated as repeated measures in an analysis of variance. The ANOVA 
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included the other independent variables. Responsibility assignments 
were found to be greater for the wife,~= 11.9, than for the husband, 
M = 9.9, f.. (1, 64) = 12.95, .Q. < .009. Also, there were no first order, 
second order, or fourth order interactions of other variables with the 
responsibility of husband and wife in this analysis. One third order 
interaction was significant, the interaction with Attitude x Action x 
Sex of subject, f.. (1, 64) = 4.16, £ < .04, but the pattern of greater 
responsibility for the wife was not disturbed. The assumption that the 
wife would be considered as the primary actor appears supported. Through-
out ,the remainder of this chapter, references to the actor and to per-
sonal responsibility will be references to the wife. 
The second possible problem from the use of abortion as the stimulus 
topic was the possibility that men and women may make differing assign-
ments of responsibility for an abortion. In anticipation of this prob-
lem, sex of subject was included as an independent variable in all analy-
. ?es of variance. However, in no analysis was the sex main effect sig-
nificant. In the analyses of the measures of justification and attrac-
tion, there were no significant interaction effects which included sex. 
There was one interaction effect which did include sex in the responsi-
bility analysis (personal and impersonal responsibility were treated as 
repeated measures of Responsibility) which was significant. This inter-
action was the interaction of Attitude x Action x Sex x Responsibility, 
f.. (1, 64) = 5.48, £ = .02. Simple effects tests (Kirk, 1968) revealed 
that anti-abortion men had assigned more impersonal responsibility, ~ = 
8.8, than had anti-abortion women,~= 4.6, for the more extreme action, 
f.. (1, 64) = 5.67, .Q_ < .02. There were no other significant simple effects 
across sex. Thus, it would appear that the results of this experiment 
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may be confidently generalized across both sexes. 
Justification 
The analysis of variance of the measure of justification (summary 
in Appendix A) revealed two significant effects: Attitude, f. (1, 64) = 
64.95, £ < .0001, and Attitude x Situation, I. (1, 64) = 4.29, £ < .04. 
Inspection of the means for the levels of Attitude, ti_ pro= 11.65 versus 
M anti = 4.65, indicated that subjects with favorable attitudes toward 
abortion found the action to be considerably more justified than did the 
anti-abortion subjects, thus offering support for Hypothesis 1. 
The means for the Attitude x Situation interaction are presented in 
Table 1. Simple effect.tests yielded a nonsignificant comparison between 
the levels of Situation for the anti-abortion subjects, but for pro-
abortion subjects the more demanding situation produced greater justifi-
cation than did the less demanding situation, I. (1, 64) = 6.79, £ < .05. 
The simple effects do not support Hypothesis 2a, in fact they indicate 
that differences were in the opposite direction than predicted. Compar-
ing the correlations of Situation with justification for Pro subjects, 
r = .45, and for Anti subjects, !.:_ = -.04, by Fisher's r to z transfor-
mation (Hays, 1963) further supports the difference,~= 2.29, £ < .01. 
Hypothesis 2, that overall the more demanding Situation would result 
in greater justification, was not supported by the Situation main effect, 
f. (1, 64) = 2.59, £ < .11. However, as just mentioned. the Attitude x 
Situation interaction revealed that Situation did influence judgments of 
justification for pro-abortion subjects. Hypothesis 2, therefore, 
appears to apply to pro-abortion subjects but not to anti-abortion 
subjects. 
TABLE l 
MEAN JUSTIFICATION RESPONSES AS A FUNCTION 






* Larger values indicate responses of· 
greater justification. Means sharing the 
same superscript are significantly differ-




For the analysis of variance for responsibility attributions, attri-
butions of personal and impersonal responsibility were treated as repeat-
ed measures of a variable titled Responsibility (summary in Appendix A). 
The analysis was a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 orthogonal design with Attitude, 
Situation, Action, Sex, and Responsibility as simple main effects. Hy-
pothesis 3 was tested via simple effects of the interaction effect of 
Attitude x Responsibility. It was predicted that observers who approved 
of the attitudes reflected by an action would assign more impersonal than 
personal responsibility while disapproving observers would assign more 
personal than impersonal responsibility. Means for the Attitude x Res-
ponsibility interaction are presented in Table 2. The interaction was 
found to be significant, .E.. (1, 64) = 13.43, .2. < .0008. Simple effect 
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tests indicated that Anti subjects did assign more personal than imper-
sonal responsibility, .E.. (1, 64) = 44.09, Q < .0001, but that the differ-
ence in attributions was not significant for Pro subjects,£..< 1. These 
results only support Hypothesis 3 as it pertains to anti-abortion sub-
jects. The hypothesis failed complete support. 
TABLE 2 













Larger values indicate attributions of great-
er responsibility. Means sharing the same s~per­
script are significantly different at the ,05 
level or beyond by simple effect tests. 
Simple effect tests on the Attitude x Responsibility interaction 
further revealed a difference in assignments of impersonal responsibili-
ty between Pro and Anti subjects,£.. (1, 64) = 15.~2, Q < .0008, and a 
difference in personal responsibility assignments which approached an 
acceptable level of significance,£.. (1, 64) = 3.43, £. < .07. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that greater impersonal than p~rsonal 
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responsibility would be attributed when apparent situational constraints 
are high and greater personal responsibility should be assigned under 
conditions of low situational demand. The hypothesis was tested through 
'simple effects tests on the Situation x Responsibility interaction. The 
interaction was significant, f. (1, 64) =.7.29, .Q. < .0009, and the means 
for the interaction are displayed in Table 3. The tests indicated that 
under low situational demand more responsibility was placed at personal 
responsibility, f. (l, 64) = 34.47~ .Q. < .0001, while attr~butions did not 
significantly differ at high situational demand, f. (1, 64) = 2.46, ns. 
Hence, Hypothesis 4 also failed full support. 
but not high situational demand. 
TABLE 3 
It was supported for low 
I '. ~ 
j ~ 
MEAN RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTIONS AS 
* A FUNCTION OF SITUATION 
Situational 
Demand Personal Impersonal 
. L~ 12.35a 7.2ab 
High 11.425 10.05b 
* Larger values indicate attributions of great-
er responsibility. Means sharing the same super-
script are significantly different at the .05 
level or beyond by simple effect tests. 
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Hypothesis 4a stated th'at attributions by di sapprovtng observers 
would be more influenced by differences in the variable Situation than 
would be attributions by approving observers. The hypothesis was tested 
by analyses on the Attitude x Situation x Responsibility interaction. 
The interaction main effect was nonsignificant (F < l} so that simple 
effect tests were considered inappropriate (Kirk, 1968). As the hypothe-
sis required nonorthogonal, pairwise comparisons, Tukey's HSD statistic 
(Kirk, 1968} was employed. These tests (Table 4) provided one signifi-
cant comparison which was across Situation at impersonal responsibility 
for Pro subjects. Instead of affecting attributions of Anti subjects, 
Situation affected the impersonal responsibility attributions of Pro 
subjects. Thus, Hypothesis 4a was not supported. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that a positive relationship would exist. 
between the dependent variables justification and impersonal responsi-
bility. The product-moment correlation coefficient between these varia-
bles supported this hypothesis, r. ( 79} = • 56, .!?.. < • 0001 . Although no 
prediction had been offered, it is of interest that personal responsi-
bility negatively correlated with justification, r.. (79} = -.29,£. < .009. 
Defensive Attribution 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that, when the conditions for internal justi-
fication are present as compared to when the conditions are not present, 
impersonal responsibility should increase and personal responsibility 
should decrease as action extremity increases. The opposite directions 
should occur when the conditions for justification are not present. The 
conditions for justification have been proposed to be a favorable atti-
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justification have been considered to be an unfavorable attitude and low 
situational demand. These conditions were compared within the Attitude 
x Situation x Action x Responsibility interaction of the Responsibility 
Attribution analysis of variance. As the third-order interaction was 
nonsignificant, .E. (1, 64) = 1.99, ns, and the pairwise comparisons were 
nonorthogonal, Tukey's HSD statistic was employed (complete results in 
Appendix C). The means of the different levels .of Action with the 
conditions favorable and unfavorable to justification upon attributions 
of responsibility are depicted in Figure 1. Visual inspection of Figure 
l will reveal that the hypothesis did not successfully predict differ-
ences in personal responsibility. Subjects unfavorable to justification 
hardly differed across Action while subjects in favorable conditions did 
significantly differ across action at the .05 level of significance, but 
in the unpredicted direction. Further, personal responsibility attribu-
tions did differ (E .. < .01) across favorable and unfavorable conditions 
for the second month abortion (less extreme action), although attribu-
tions for the more extreme action were not appreciably different. Great-
er differences were expected for the fifth month abortion (extreme 
action) than for the second month abortion. 
Maintaining attention on Figure l, it will be noted that attribu-
tions of impersonal responsibility were in the predicted directions. 
For both conditions of Action, subjects in conditions favorable to justi-
fication assigned greater impersonal responsibility than did subjects in 
unfavorable conditions. However, judgments did not diverge significantly 
across action extremity within either favorable or unfavorable groups. 
Hence, although impersonal responsibility attributions appear to support 
the hypothesis, differences are of insufficient magnitude. Neither 
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Favorable = Pro-High Demand 
Unfavorable = Anti-Low Demand 
Figure 1. Responsibility Attributions in Conditions 
Theo~~tic~lly Favo~~ble·~nd Unfavor~ble 
to Justification 
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personal nor impersonal responsibility assignments support the hypothe~is. 
Although Hypothesis 6 was not supported, it may be of value to fur-
ther inspect the Attitude x Situation x Action x Responsibility inter-
action. The interacti,on was analyzed at each level of Situation. Figure 
2 presents the pattern of means within the high demand situation and 
Figure 3 presents the means within the low demand situations. Besides 
the redundant information, similarities may be noted between Figure 1 
and Figure 2. ~Jith Tukey's HSD statistic, personal responsibility did 
significantly differ (.Q. < .05) across Attitude for the second month but 
not fifth month abortion. For impersonal responsibility at each level 
of Action, pro~abortion subjects attributed more impersonal responsibili-
ty than anti-abortion subjects (.Q. < .01). Once more, though, within each 
level of Attitude there were nonsignificant differences across Action. 
Moving to Figure 3, Tukey's test indicated no differences in per-
sonal responsibility by Attitude or by Action. However, interesting 
differences are to be found among attributions of impersonal responsi-
bility. Impersonal responsibility did not differ across Attitude for the 
less extreme action while attributions did diverge (£ < .01) across 
Attitude for the more extreme action and in the predicted direction. 
Also, pro-abortion subjects in the more extreme action condition assigned 
greater impersonal responsibility than did pro subjects in the less 
extreme condition (£ < .05). According to Scheffe's S ratio (Kirk, 1968) 
the difference between the levels of Attitude at the more extreme action 
was greater than the difference between the levels of Attitude at the 
less extreme action,£ (3, 64) = 4.01, .Q. < .0125. Thus, an example of 
defensive attribution was found in the impersonal responsibility attri-
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As Hypothesis 7, it was predicted that judgments of justification 
would be more likely to influence jud9ments of responsibility than would 
subjects' attraction for the stimulus person. This hypothesis was. 
tested with the aid of Fisher's r to z transformation by companing the 
responsibility items' correlations with the measure of justification and 
with the measure of attraction (Table 5). The correlations of personal 
responsibility with justification and with attraction were almost identi-
cal. However, the correlation of impersonal responsibility with justi-
fication was greater than the impersonal responsibility - attraction 
correlation, !. = 2.34, .Q. < .01,. one-tailed. Hypothesis 7 is, therefore, 
supported only for impersonal responsibility. 
Justifi ca ti on 
Attraction 
TABLE 5 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF ATTITUDE AND 
RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTIONS WITH 
JUSTIFICATION AND ATTRACTION 
Attitude Personal Impersonal Responsibility Responsibility 
.67 -.29 .56 
.38 -.27 .36 
i ·~ : 
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Another comparison between correlations adds support to the con-
tention that the salient influences present in the study have more to do 
with justification than with attraction. Note in Table 5 that the 
variable Attitude has a greater correlation with justifiqation than with 
attraction, ~ = 3.66, £. < .0002. 
An interesting observation may be made about the relationship 
between justification and attraction. As can be seen in Appendix B, 
justification correlates more with attraction than does any other varia-
ble in the study. This observation may have implications for attraction 
theory. 
Justification as an Independent Variable 
The presentation of the results of the analysis of variance for the 
measure of justification provided support for the proposed dimensions 
affecting justification. Attitude was found to be the dominant dimen-
sion and Situation influenced the judgments made by subjects with a 
favorable attitude. The analysis bf variance for the responsibility 
attributions indicated that the variables Attitude and Situation were 
both significant influences on attribution. Since the dimensions of 
justification influenced responsibility attributions, it may be inferred 
that perceived justification for an act is related to attributions of 
responsibility for the act. That such a relationship exists is supported 
by the correlation coefficients. While viable inferences may be drawn 
from these analyses concerning the influence of justification upon attri-
butions, a clearer perspective may be gained by employing justification 
as an independent variable. Such a strategy would be particularly 
applicable to determining the influence of justification on defensive 
attributions as the dimensional approach failed to provide compelling 
evidence of a relationship between justification and defensive attri-
bution. 
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For an ANOVA analysis of .the effects of justification on attribu-
tions, judgments of justification were classed into two groups: High 
Justification and Low Justification. Since a 15 point scale had been 
used for responses, responses above eight were assigned to the High 
Justification conditions and responses below eight were assigned to 
Low Justification. Five subjects who had rated justification at eight 
on the scale were removed from the analysis. Justification as an inde-
pendent variable was included in an analysis of variance along with 
Action and Responsibility. Once more Responsibility was a repeated 
measure for personal and impersonal responsibility. To achieve equal 
cell sizes across the conditions of Justification and Action, eleven 
more subjects were selected at random to be removed from the analysis. 
While 16 subjects which had been included in the original analyses were 
not included in this analysis, subjects from the original conditions 
were represented approximately equally within the remaining 64 subjects. 
Results of the analysis (summary in Appendix A) demonstrated a 
significant Justification x Responsibility interaction, .E_ (1, 60) = 31.4, 
£ < .0001. Means for the interaction are shown in Table 6. Simple 
effect tests revealed several differences of interest. Personal res-
ponsibility was greater at Low Justification than at High Justification, 
.E_ (1, 60) = 7.99, £ < .01, and impersonal responsibility was greater at 
High Justification than at Low Justification, .E_ (1, 60) = 32.73, £ < 
.0001. At Low Justification more personal than impersonal responsibili-
ty was assigned, .E_ (1, 60) = 58.42, £ < .0001, while responsibility 
attributions did not differ at High Justification (£. < 1). 
TABLE 6 
MEAN RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTIONS AS 
* A FUNCTION OF JUSTIFICATION 
Responsibility Source 
Justification Personal Impersonal 
Lpw 13.47ab 5.8lac 
High. 10.84b 11. l 3c 
* Larger values indicate attributions of 
greater responsibility. Means sharing the same 
superscript are significantly different at the 
.01 level or beyond by simple effect tests. 
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To examine the influence of Justification on defensive attributions 
the Justification x Action x.Responsibility interaction was inspected. 
The pattern of means for this interaction effect is depicted in Figure 
4. The interaction effect being nons i gnifi cant (f. < 1), Tu key's HSD 
statistic was employed. From Figure 4 it is apparent that Action did 
not effect attributions within the Low Justification condition. A sig-
nificant difference also was not found between personal responsibility 
attributions across A~tion in High Justification. But, for the High 
Justification condition greater impersonal responsibility was assigned 
for the more extreme action (£ < .01). Thus, as action severity in-
creases, subjects who saw the act as justified assigned more impersonal 
responsibility. Note that the defensiveness among impersonal responsi-
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Justification and Responsibility Attributions 
The Dimensions of Justif~cation 
The variable Attitude was found to be the dominant influence on per-
ceived justification. Subjects who.approved of the general class of 
similar acts considered the act to be more justified than did subjects 
who did not approve of the class of acts. The variable Situation, that 
is whether or not the actor's situation constrained choice of action, 
operated secondarily to Attitude. Situation influenced justification 
ratings for subjects with favorable attitudes but it did not effect 
justification for unfavorable subjects. Even though favorable subjects 
thought the less demanding situation was less justifying than the more 
demanding situation, in .both conditions of Situation the pro-abortion 
subjects assigned greater justification than did the anti-abortion 
subjects. Therefore, the dominance of Attitude as a variable effecting 
perceptions of justification is quite apparent. 
The differential i:nfluence of Situation on subjects favorable and 
unfavorable to the act requires comment. Why did subjects favorable to 
the act vary ratings of justification according to situational demand 
while unfavorable subjects did not? A foundation for an answer to this 
question will emerge from an analysis of the relationship between 
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justification and responsibility attributions. 
The dimensions .of justification, Attitude and Situation, operated 
much the same on responsibility attributions as they did on the measure 
of justification. This comparison is particularly applicable to attri-
butions of impersonal responsibility. The comparison is evidenced by 
three findings .. (1) Pro-abortion subjects assigned greater impersonal 
responsibility than did anti-abortion subjects.but pro subjects assigned 
only slightly less personal responsibility than did anti subjects. Also 
as with justification, (2) greater impersonal responsibility was assigned 
in the high demand situation than in the low demand situation whereas 
personal responsibility failed to differ across the conditions of 
Situation. (3) Of further interest is the observation that when the 
effect of Situation was considered separately.upon pro and anti subjects, 
a statistically significant difference in impersonal responsibility. 
across Situation was found only for pro subjects. Thus, the dimensions. 
of justification effected impersonal responsibility attributions, but 
not personal responsibility attributions, in much the same manner as 
they affected justification ratings; 
That the variables Attitude and Situation are influencing attiibu-
tions as dimensions of perceived justification is supported by the use 
of justification ratings as an independent variable. While the levels 
of justification produced differences in all responsibility ratings, 
the difference in impersonal responsibility was considerably larger than 
the difference in personal responsibility. These differences were 
similar to the effects of the variables Attitude and Situation. A 
further similarity exists in that subjects who assigned low justifi-
cation also assigned more personal than impersonal responsibility. 
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Subjects who saw the act as justified assigned approximately equal 
amounts of personal and impersonal responsibility. Note that in the 
responsibility analysis of variance with Attitude and Situation as 
independent variables, the conditions .of these variables .which were 
theoretically associated with law justification yielded similar results. 
Since justification as an independent variable influenced attributions 
much the same as did its proposed dimensions, support may be inferred for 
the operation of Attitude and Situation as dimensions.of perceived 
justification. 
A Model of Justification 
The evidence appears to suggest that a more intimate relationship 
exists between justification and impersonal responsibility than between 
justification and personal responsibility. Of course, such a compari-
son was implicitly predicted 'by Hypothesis 5, but the ubiquitousness .of 
the comparison was not anticipated. From Heider's (1958} summative 
model of personal and impersonal causation, one would expect an extreme-
ly strong negative correlation between personal and impersonal responsi-
bility and for the attributions to correlate almost equally with other 
measures. The current data do not support these expectations. That the 
attributions are not summative may cast doubt upon Heider's summative 
model. One should bear in mind, however, that causality and responsi~ 
bility may not be identical elements in Heider's model. The data suggest 
that personal and impersonal responsibility attributions differ along 
other dimensions than exclusively locus of causality. If there are a 
variety of dimensions.affecting responsibility attributions, personal 
responsibility may be qualitatively different from imper$onal 
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responsibility. Although the present experiment provides little infor-
mation as to the nature of these differences, it does indicate that 
impersonal responsibility is related more to justification than is per-
sonal responsibility. An attempt shall be made at a theoretical under-
standing of the process of justification from these relationships within 
the current data. 
There are several theories in the literature of psychology which 
propose that individuals strive to gain correct information about the 
environment. Such theories have been offered by Festinger (1954), 
Gibson (1969), Kelley (1967, 1971) and White (1959) among.many others. 
These theorists maintain that, within limits and over time, individuals 
tend to assume that they correctly understand many of the characteristics 
of the physical and social environment. It is here proposed that an 
individual's assumptions as to appropriate actions and attitudes will be 
based upon those assumptions about the state of nature. Those actions 
and attitudes of either oneself or another which are consistent with 
one's understanding of the environment will be seen as having been caused 
by the environment and, thus, relatively high impersonal responsibility 
will be attribut~d. Since the action is seen as being caused by the 
environment, the action will be considered justified. When behavior is 
inconsistent with one's understanding of the environment, responsibility 
will be attributed to the actor as behavior is seen as being caused by 
factors independent of the environment. The present data demonstrate, 
however, that personal responsibility can also be attributed when 
behavior~ consistent with the perceived environment. Perhaps these 
personal responsibility attributions are related to perceived intention-. 
ality within the situational context. Nonetheless, it is clear from the 
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data that perceived consistency between behavior and the perceivl!d 
environment is related more to impersonal than to personal responsibility. 
While this explanation of the relationship between justification 
and impersonal responsibility fits the results of the current experi-
ment, post hoc reasoning is often considered to be less compelling than 
a priori hypotheses •. It -can be shown, though, that the explanatory 
model is consistent with ideas offered earlier in this paper and with 
findings by other researchers. 
Recall that it was proposed that perceptions of justification would 
be mediated by {l) variations in the act's reflection of the observer's 
attitudes and (2) by the degree to which situational forces were per-
ceived to have elicited the response. While attitudes may serve several 
functions {Katz, 1960), the essential nature of at.titudes is that they 
are interpretations.of the environment {Sherif and Hovland, 1961). 
Since attitudes are based on perceptions .of reality, actions resulting 
from attitudes can be considered as ultimate effects of external con-
tingencies. Thus, not only does.the justification model account for 
the data, it also accounts for the influence of attitudes upon attribu-
tions and perceptions of justification. However, the second dimension 
of justification, Situation, is in danger of becoming a restatement 
of Attitude. To say that Attitude mediates justification by determining 
if the environment is seen as the source of causation and then to state 
that Situation is the degree to which the environment influences 
Gausation is redundant. According to this statement, the dimension 
Attitude subsumes the dimension Situation. Redundancy may be avoided 
by considering Attitude as a general response to the environment and by 
considering Situation as. environmental influences in a specific 
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situation. When Attitude, as a general interpretation of situational 
influence, is inconsistent with an action, then Situation, as a specific. 
instance of situational influence, will be irrelevant to judgments of 
impersonal responsibility. If Attitude is consistent with action, 
Situation becomes relevant as a specific instance of the general prin-
ciple, and impersonal responsibility is perceived. Note that this 
argument is supported by the data. In the ana1ys is of the measure of 
justification only pro-abortion subjects were influenced by variations 
in Situation and in the analysis of .responsibility attributions only 
impersonal attributions.by pro-subjects were effected by Situation. 
A trend of research in attribution processes comes to mind as 
support for the proposed account of the data. In extending an idea put 
forth by Heider {1958), Jones and Nisbett (1971) have argued that actors 
tend to believe that their actions are primarily caused by situational 
contingencies while observers perceive causes for the behaviors in 
dispositional properties of the actors. This divergence in attributions 
has been supported in a variety of experiments (for example; Nisbett, 
Caputo, Legant, and Marecek, 1973; Storms, 1973). Of interest for 
present concerns is the observation that actors tend to see their 
behavior as a result of environmental circumstance. The observation 
may be taken as support for the premise that phenomenologically, 
behavior is based on individuals' perceptions of the environment. 
Phenomenological support is of primary concern as the act of attributing 
is based upon phenomenological data. 
Justification and Personal Responsibility 
These results have been shown to support a model of justification 
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based on impersonal responsibility. What, then, can be said about the 
relationship between justification and personal responsibility? This 
question is important since Heider (1958) posited that less personal 
respons.ibility would be assigned at the level of Justified Commission 
than at Purposive Commission. Heider's position was supported in the 
current data by the use of perceived justification as an independent 
variable .. Unfortunately for the ideas put forth in the second chapter 
of this paper, the variables Attitude and Situation did not significant-
ly affect personal responsibility attributions. Nevertheless, Attitude, 
Situation, and perceived justification did provide similar patterns of 
results which are relevant to distinctions between Justified Commission 
and Purposive Commission. In all conditions associated with low justi-
fication (Purposive Commission), personal responsibility attributions 
were greater than impersonal respons:ibility attributions. In those 
co.nditions associated with high justification (Justified Comnission), 
personal and impersonal responsibility attributions did not differ. 
There was a trend, although usually not significant, for personal res-
ponsibility to decrease with conditions favorable to justification and 
a significant trend for impersonal responsibility to increase. Thus, 
from large differences within the distribution of responsibility with 
Purposive Commission, the assignments equalize at moderately high 
amounts of both personal and impersonal responsibility with Justified 
Commission. This evidence indicates that the difference between Pur-
posive Commission and Justified Commission lies more with differences 
in impersonal responsibility than with personal responsibility. 
That personal responsibility was less affected than impersonal 
responsibility by variables related to justification may result from 
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personal intentionality. Recall that Heider (1958) believed intentions 
to be the central factor of personal responsibility attributions and 
that the levels of Purposive and Justified Commission both deal with 
intentional acts. The results suggest that when an act is intentional, 
whether justified or not, personal responsibility will be attributed. 
When an act is justified, responsibility is seen as distributed across 
personal and impersonal sources instead of only personal sources as 
with unjustified actions. It would have been of value if a measure of 
intentionality had been included in the present experiment. As su~h a 
measure was not included, this argument lacks empirical backing. 
Defensive Attributions 
The hypothesis which was to demonstrate that defensive attributions 
are an example of the influence of justification on attributions was not 
supported. It was unsuccessfully predicted that as action extremity 
increased, conditions favorable to justification (pro-abortion and high 
situational demand) would yield blame avoiding attributions and that 
conditions unfavorable to justification (anti-abortion and low situ-
ational demand) would yield 11 victim-blaming 11 attributions. Consider-
ation of the experimental setting, stimulus material, and pattern of 
results suggests several factors which may have led to the data's 
failure to support the hypothesis. 
That 87% of the subjects in the experiment (83% in the analyses) 
were students at a medium size, high tuition, private school (Tulsa 
University) may have influenced the results. This statement appears 
likely when the current results are compared with results from a pilot 
study conducted with students from Central State University, a small, 
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low tuition, state university at Edmond, Oklahoma. The pilot study at 
Central State was identical to the current study in every.respect except 
for location and that only the high demand level of Situation was 
employed. The results of the pilot study were similar to the present 
results except for those results pertaining to defensive attribution. 
With the high demand Situation, neither personal responsibility 
attributions nor impersonal responsibility attributions differed across 
Attitude for the second month abortion. But, for the fifth month 
abortion, greater personal responsibility was assigned by anti-abortion 
subjects than by pro-aQortion subjects and greater impersonal responsi-
bility was assigned by pro-abortion subjects than by anti-abortion 
subjects. As the attributions did not differ for the less extreme 
action and did differ for the more extreme action, an interpretation 
of defensive attribution is tenable. Observation of the results of 
the same conditions in the present experiment does not reveal a similar 
pattern (Figure 2). For personal responsibility, pro and anti subjects 
differ at the second month abortion but not the fifth month one. Also, 
pro subjects assign greater personal responsibility for the more 
extreme action. For impersonal responsibility, subjects differ across 
Attitude for both conditions of Action. An interpretation of defensive 
attribution could be made if the separate conditions of Attitude differed 
across Action or if Attitude differed more across the fifth month than 
second month abortion. Unfortunately, these conditions are not met. 
Interestingly enough, defensive attributions in the present study 
appeared in the low demand Situation (Figure 3). With impersonal 
responsibility, pro-abortion subjects increased attributions for the 
more extreme action and Attitude differed more for the more extreme than 
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less extreme action. 
Comparing the two sets of subjects, the Central State University 
students provided defensive attributions for the high demand situation 
while the Tulsa University students provided defensive attributions for 
the low demand Situation. Perhaps it is plausible to speculate that 
the CSU students found the high demand Situation similar to their own 
experiences and the TU students, with more per capita wealth and 
correspondingly greater personal freedom, found the low demand Situation 
more similar to their experiences. Thus, stimulus person - subject 
similarity would have influenced defensive attributions as proposed by 
Shaver (1970). The speculation is supported by information from the 
schools' cata~ogues in that tuition per semester hour at CSU is $10.50 
in state and $27 out of state (for a 15-hour semester cost of $160 or 
$405) whereas tuition at TU is $50 per semester hour or $650 per 
semester (12-18 semester hours). Tuition may be a deceptive index of 
student affluence as stuQent loans, scholarships, and employment can 
ease the burden of high tuition, but it is-perhaps equally likely that 
CSU students would need assistance in paying the low tuition as TU 
students would need assistance to pay the high tuition. If assistance 
levels were constant, then TU students would begin with more money than 
CSU students. Therefore, with or without financial assistance, TU 
students on the average may be assumed to be more affluent than CSU 
students. As the distinctive characteristic between conditions of 
Situation was affluence of stimulus persons, it is plausible to think 
that the CSU students may have considered themselves as similar to the 
less affluent stimulus persons and that the TU students found them-
selves more similar to the more affluent stimulus persons. 
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Using the proposed dimensions of justification, the relationship 
between justification and defensive attribution is still rather tenuous. 
From the dimensional analysis it.appears that subjects• .attitude and 
perceived similarity with stimulus persons controls the appearanc~ of 
defensive attributions. Since it has been found that Attitude is the 
dominant dimension of perceived justification and since one could 
easily argue that perceived similqrity can act to bias one 1 s perception 
of the environment, one could maintain that the same forces which 
influence the perception of justification influence defensive attri-
butions. Even though the same processes may account for both responses, 
the argument may appear rather extended from the results of these 
analyses. 
The measure of justification was substituted for the proposed 
dimensions of justification as an independent variable in order to 
avoid the above problem in inference. In the analysis of variance with 
Justification and Action as independent variables defensive attri-
butions were fo~nd with impersonal responsibility attributions for 
those subjects who considered the act to be justified (Figure 4). From 
this analysis, then, one.could infer that justification does indeed 
influence defensive attributions .. 
One problem remains. Those theorists who have dealt with.defensive 
attri buti ans have consi dere~· ·on_ly a.~tr·i.~uti ans of personal responsi-
bility (Shaver, 1970; Walster, 1966). The present results reveal 
defensive attributions not in personal responsibility but in impersonal 
responsibility. Therefo~e, i"t would appear that justification and 
defensive attributions of personal responsibility,as described by 
other researchers, are separate phenomena. When dealing with impersonal 
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attributions, defensive attributions are a reflection of justification. 
That justification influenced only defensive attributions within 
impersonal responsibility is consistent with the theoretical model 
proposed earlier in this discussion to account for the relationship 
between justification and responsibility attributions. Subjects who 
did not consider the act to be.justified did not change their attri-
butions for the act's extremity (Figure 4). Any variation of the act, 
extreme or otherwise, did not alter responsibility assignments. Sub-
jects who did consider the act to be.justified assigned more impersonal 
responsibility and apparently, but not significantly, simultaneously 
more personal responsipility for the more extreme action. 
It is suggested that the incre~s~d impersonal responsibility 
assignments were a defensive measure t~ avoid blame for a possible 
increase of personal resppnsibility assignments. In essence, subjects 
were making a plea of extenuating circumstances. The possibility of. 
greater personal responsibility was def~nded by greater impersonal 
responsibility. Note that the increase in personal responsibility was 
not statistically significant so that it has been interpreted as an 
anticipated possibility~ 
As a final comment on defensive attribution, it should be pointed 
out that other studies on this phenomenon (Shaver, 1970; Walster, 1966; 
etc.) h~ve used stimulus material depicting an accident. The current 
stimulus mate.rial did depict an accidental pregnancy, but the action 
of interest was.the stimulus persons' reaction to the pregnancy. The 
reaction was so presented as to give the impression of intentionality. 
While other researchers have studied attributions for accidents, the 
present study looked at attributions for reactions to an accident. 
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Thus, the current results may not be directly comparable to earlier 
studies. The extent to which these results are comparable can only be 
determined through further research. That the present study found 
evidence of defensive attributions for an intentional act could be a 
most interesting observation. 
Attraction 
The measure of subjects' liking for the main stimulus person was 
included in the experiment to investigate the possibility that the· 
manipulations might be more closely related to changes.in attraction 
than in justification. If such were the case, instead of manipulating 
the effect of justification upon attributions, the experiment would be 
manipulating the effect of attraction upon attributions. From the 
results it can be observed that the variable Attitude had a much greater 
influence upon justification than upon attraction. It may be assumed, 
therefore, that justification was the more salient feature of the 
experiment. 
The correlation of the measure of attraction with as~ignments of 
personal responsibility was not significantly different from the 
correlation of the measure of justification with personal responsibility 
assignments .. However, the correlation between attraction and impersonal 
responsibility was significantly less than the correlation between 
justification and impersonal responsibility. That attraction and 
justification equally affected personal responsibility attributions 
while justification affected impersonal responsibility more than did 
attraction fits with the theoretical model. Apparently many factors 
may equally covary with attributions of personal responsibility, while 
impersonal responsibility attributions are primarily related to per-
ceptions of justification. 
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That attraction was related ~ore to justification than to Attitude 
may have implications for attraction processes. Byrne (1971) has 
theorized that interpersonal attraction is mediated by the ability of 
another to provide relatively more rewards than punishments. O~ such 
reward is proposed to be attitude similarity. Within Byrne's model 
(1971) attitude similarity functions as a reward by providing consensual 
validation for the belief that one understands the phenomenal world 
correctly. If one adopts Byrne's model, the present results appear to 
indicate that perception of another's justified action serves as a more 
potent reward than does perception of another's i:lttitude similarity. 
Byrne (1971) and others have shown that attraction increases with the 
number of similar attitudes. As there was but one attitude presented in 
the current experiment, the present results are of unknown generality. 
However, they may serve as a guide to further research. It could very 
well be that individuals are more significantly rewarded by under-
standing others' behaviors than others• attitudes. That is, one's 
understanding of the phenomenal world may have greater relevance for 
proper actions than for proper attitudes. Actions, after all, are 
primary if attitudes have their basis in the observation of actions. 
Perceived Justification and External Justification 
As discussed earlier, the results of the present experiment suggest 
that perceptions of justification are derived from a four-step process. 
These steps are as follows: 
1. The individual acquires perceptions .or judgments of 
the external environment. 
2. From these observations the individual makes judgments 
about actions and attitudes appropriate for the 
environment. 
3. Those actions and attitudes of oneself or of others 
which are consistent with one 1 s view of the world are 
attributed to impersonal responsibility. 
4. Being attributed to impersonal responsibility, such 
actions and attitudes will be considered as justified. 
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As the results indicate a relatively weak relationship of personal 
responsibility with impersonal responsibility and personal responsi-
bility with justification, the above model appears not to be useful for 
personal responsibility attributions. 
Recall from Chapter I that Heider 1 s (1958) level of Justified 
Commission (Shaw and Sulzer, 1964) was dissected into two dimensions. 
These dimensions were (1) the circumstances of the situation and (2) 
socially acceptable behavior in the situation. Heider 1 s discussion of 
justified action dealt with what has been termed as external justifi-
cation. The present model for perceived justification corresponds 
well with the dimensions of external justification. The first dimension 
of external justification (circumstances) fits within the first step 
of perceived justification. Perception of the circumstances of the 
situation are a part of the perception of the environment. The second 
dimension (socially acceptable behavior) fits within the second step. 
One of the criteria of acceptable actions is that they are appropriate 
for the environment. Hence, while the proposed model was designed to 
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account for individual differences in assignments of justification, it 
also may be considered as an expansion of Heider's (1958) level of 
Justified Commission. 
The current results and theoretical model may help to r~solve an 
inconsistency in the results of experiments reported by Shaw. In two 
experiments reported by Shaw and Sulzer (1964} which were designed to 
examine differences in personal re~ponsibility attributions across 
Heider's (1958) five levels it was found that personal responsibility 
attributions did not differ between the levels of Purposive Commission 
and Justified Commission. Later studies which were very similar to the 
1964 studies did find that less personal responsibility was assigned 
for the level of Justified Commission than for Purposive Commission 
(Shaw and Reitan, 1969). This inconsistency in results is similar to 
the current experiment's low relationship between justification and 
personal responsibility. The present analysis would indicate that a 
more consistent pattern of results could have been achieved if the 
occurence of impersonal responsiblity with personal responsibility had 
been systematically considered. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study indicated several things about th.e nature 
of justification and the influence of perceived justification upon 
responsibility attributions. Foremost among the results was the indi-
cation of a model of the justification process, i.e., that actions 
consistent with one's perceptions of .the environment are considered as 
justified. The model was found to apply reliably only to attributions. 
of impersonal responsibility. 
The prediction that defensive attributions are a special case of 
justification was not supported. Prior work with defensive attributions 
has concentrated upon defensive attributions.of personal responsibility. 
The defensive attributions in the present results were.defensive 
impersonal responsibility attributions. While the prediction was not 
supported, the finding that justification is related to defensive 
impersonal responsibility attributions is of interest. These findings 
may be compared to the courtroom plea of extenuating circumstances: 
the person is responsible for the act, but the action was justified. 
To increase the probability of.such a plea being honored in a courtroom 
setting, it may be inferred from these results that it would be 
prudent for the defendent to present his action and himself in suGh a 
manner as to be appropriate within the judge and/or jury's belief's 
about the environment. The.dictim is familiar: know your audience. 
69 
70 
An act's reflection of attitudes held by an observer was proposed 
to influence perceptions of justification. Elsewhere attitude , 
similarity has been associated with interpersonal attraction. If the 
experimental conditions had been found to be more closely related to 
attraction than justification, arguments about the relationship of 
justification and responsibility attributions would have been weakened. 
The results demonstrated that the manipulations had a greater effect 
on perceptions of justification. The results further suggested that 
attraction may be more influnenced by justified action than by attitude 
similarity. · These relationships could be an area for further study. 
Several ideas for further investigation have been developed from 
consideration of the present study, two of which have been derived from 
the justification model. The proposed model of the justification 
process is based upon individuals' perceptions of the social and 
physical environment. As perceptions are both veridical and nonveridical, 
they are a potentially rich area of study for attribution concerns. 
Nonveridical perceptions are of interest since they can produce 
attributional biases (Shaver, 1970; Kelley, 1971). In the present 
data, the defensive impersonal responsibility attributions were 
interpreted as resulting from the bias of .avoiding blame. Other biases 
may effect perceptions of justification. 
As one bias which may be of interest, Kelley (1971) has cited 
evidence to the effect that persons are held more personally responsible 
for actions directed at gain than for actions directed at the prevention 
of loss. One wonders what effect these different types of actions 
would have upon perceptions of justification. The present study demon-
strated greater justification for an action whose aim was the 
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prevention of loss (high situational demand) relative to an action 
whose aim was neither the prevention of loss nor the acquisition of 
gain (low situational demand) so that the question remains unanswered. 
It .may be of theoretical value to consider the effect of the goal of 
behavior on justification. 
An attribution bias which was mentioned in the preceeding chapter 
was the actor-observer divergence (Jones and Nisbett, 1971). Results 
from several studies have found that actors tend to a~tribute responsi-
bility for their actions to the situation while observers of the action 
tend to attribute responsi.bil tty to the actor. The present study would 
suggest that the divergence in attributions would decrease if the 
observer considered the action justified. The decrease in the 
divergence would result from an increase in attributed impersonal 
responsibility for the actor. Present data indicates that perceptions 
of justification could be manipulated in an actor-observer si~uati9n 
by varying the saliency of similar attitudes and the saliency of 
situational constraints. 
The third suggestion for further research does not deal with 
attributional biases, but deals instead with a direct extension of the 
present study. The present analyses dealt with attitudes toward 
abortion. In employing this topic, it was implicitly assumed that any 
topic of common concern would yield results simil.ar to any other topic 
of broad concern. The study was concerned with the influence of atti-
tudes as a hypothet i ca 1 construct and not with the influence of 
~sp~cific attitudes. However, a specific attitude was employed in the 
experiment and was interpreted as representative of a hypothetical 
construct. There is no data to vitiate this procedure for inference. 
Nevertheless, greater confidence in the present inferences could be 
obtained by presenting other attitude topics in a similar design. 
Such research could test the generality of the present results. 
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APPENDIX A 
SUMMARIES OF ANA~YSES OF VARIANCE 
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SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTIFICATION 
Source of-Variation df MS F 
Attitude {A) 1 980.00 64.95 
Situation {B) 39.20 2.60 
A x B 64.80 4.29 
A at B1 {low) 1 270.40 17.92 
A at B2 {high) 1 774.40 51.33 
Bat A1 {anti) 1 1.60 .11 
B at A2 {pro) l . 102 .40 6.79 
Action {C) 1 11. 25 .75 
A x C 1 14.45 .96 
B x C 1 2.45 .16 
A x B x C 1 4.05 .27 
Sex of subject {D) 1 .05 
A x D 1 .45 .03 
B x D 1 1. 25 .08 
A x B x D 1 6.05 .40 
C x D 1 33.80 2.24 
A x C x D 1 12.80 .85 
B x C x D 1 24.20 1. 60 
A x B x C x D 1 9.80 .65 
Error 64 15.09 
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SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR 
* ATTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
Source of Variation df MS F Prob. > F 
Between Ss 
Attitude (A) l 35. 16 3. 13 ns 
Situation (B) l 37.06 3.30 ns 
A x B l . 31 .07 ns 
Action (C) l 29.76 2.65 ns 
A x C l 56.41 5.03 .03 
B x C l 20.31 1.81 ns 
A x B x C l . 16 .02 ns 
Sex of subject (D) l 12.66 1.13 ns 
A x D l 3.31 .29 ns 
B x D l 68.91 6.14 .02 
A x B x D 4.56 .41 ns 
C x D l 17.56 1.56 ns 
A x C x D l 41 .01 3.65 .06 (ns) 
B x C x D l 9.51 .85 ns 
A x B x C x D l 35.16 3.13 ns 
Ss witM n groups 64 11. 22 
Within Ss 
Responsibility (E) l 425.76 21. 77 .0001 
A x E 1 262~66 13.43 .0008 
A at El {personal) l 52,81 3.43** .07 (ns) 
A at E2 ( i mpersona 1 ) 1 245.00 15.92** .0001 
E at A1 (anti) 1 678.61 44.09 .0001 
80 
(con 1t) 
Source of Variation df MS F Prob. > F 
E at A2 (pro) l 9.8 .64 ns 
B x E l 142.51 7.29 .009 
B at El 1 17 .11 1.11** rls 
B at E2 l lp2.45 l 0. 56** .005 
E at B1 (1 ow) l 530.45 34.47 .0001 
E at B2 (high) l 37.81 2.46 ns 
A x B x E l 15. 01 .77 ns 
C x E l 4.56 .23 ns 
A x C x E l 5.26 .27 ns 
B x C x E l lo. 51 .54 ns 
A x B x C x E l 39.01 1. 99 ns 
D x E l 6.01 • 31 ns. 
A x D x E l 1.81 .09 ns 
B x D x E l .76 .04 ns 
A x B x D x E l 35.16 1.80 ns 
C x D x E l 7,66 .39 ns. 
A x C x D x E l 107.26 5.48 .02 
B x C x D x E l 33.31 1. 70 ns 
A x B x C x D x E l 9.51 .40 ns 
E x Ss within groups 64 19.56 
* Only Within Subjects sources are of concern as personal and imper- .. 
sonal responsibility are confounded in Between Subjects sources. 
** F-ratio with pooled error. 
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ATTRIBUTIONS 
OF RESPONSIBILITY WITH JUSTIFICATION OF AN 
* INDEPENDENT ~ARIABLE 
Source of Variation df MS F 
Between Ss 
Justification (A) 1 57;78 5. 01 
Action (B) 1 45. 13 3.91 
A x B 69.03 5.98 
Ss within groups 60 11. 54 
Within Ss 
Responsibility (C) 1 435. 13 27. 11 
A x C 1 504.03 31.40 
A at c1 {personal) 1 110. 25 7.99** 
A at c2 ( impersona 1) 1 451.56 32.73** 
C at A1 ( 1 ow) 937.89 58.42 
C at A2 (high) 1 1.27 . 08 
B x C 6. 13 .38 
A x B x C 2.53 . 16 
C x Ss within groups 60 16.05 
* Only Within Subjects sources are of concern as personal 
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so.naL responsibility are confounded in Between Subjects sources. 
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F~ratio with pooled error. 
APPENDIX B 
CORRELATION MATRIX OF INDEPENDENT 
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• **Q. < .Ol 
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ANALYSES FOR DEFENSIVE ATTRIBUTIONS IN ATTITUDE x 
SITUATION x ACTION x RESPONSIBILITY INTERACTION 







Tukey's HSD values: 
MEAN RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTIONS AS A FUNCTION OF ACTION 
AND CONDITIONS THEORETICALLY FAVORABLE AND 






Low High (Difference) Low High (Difference) 
3.6 12. l 3.5* 11. 2 13. l 1.9 
13.2 12.6 0.6 6.6 5.0 1.6 
4.6* 0.5 4.6* 8. l* 
error pooled 
*3.51£.<.05 
**4.66 £. < .01 
CX> 
U"I 
MEAN RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTIONS ~JITHIN HIGH SITUATIONAL 

















Tu key 1 s HSD va.l ues: error poo 1 ed 
*3.51 .Q. < .05 





















Tukey 1 s HSD values: 
MEAN RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTIONS WITHIN LOW SITUATIONAL 




Low High. {Difference) Low 
12.2 11.4 0.8 6.8 
13.2 12.6 0.6 6.6 
1.0 1.2 0.2 
error pooled 
*3.51 £ < .05 
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